INTRODUCTION
A critical strategic decision facing any firm with a new innovation is whether to seek to realize its value by transacting in the ideas market (e.g., by licensing) or by competing downstream in the product market (Gans and Stern, 2010; Teece, 1986) . The ideas market plays an important, and expanding, role in economic growth and the diffusion of knowledge. Its size has increased by more than three times between 1995 and 2002 in terms of transaction value (Arora and Gambardella, 2010) . Robbins (2006) estimates domestic income from licensing intellectual property (IP) in the United States was approximately $50 billion in 2002, and Arora and Gambardella (2010) estimate the global market for technology was about $100 billion in the same year. In addition to the potentially high social Keywords: technology licensing; intellectual property rights; market for ideas; market failure; licensing process *Correspondence to: Laurina Zhang, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, M5S 3L4, Canada. E-mail: l.zhang08@rotman.utoronto.ca Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and private gains to trade, a well-functioning market for ideas can facilitate vertical specialization; for example, many biotechnology firms specialize in discovery and early-stage development of drugs and diagnostics, which are then transferred downstream to pharmaceutical firms that specialize in manufacturing, marketing, and distribution. Furthermore, a well-functioning ideas market may be able to improve the efficiency of resource allocation decisions by directing R&D effort through market prices rather than by internal organizational processes.
However, growing anecdotal evidence suggests that the market for ideas is prone to failure. Rivette and Klein (2000) claim "a staggering $1 trillion in [ignored] intellectual property asset wealth" is foregone in the United States. We present survey data where a quarter of the firms claim they are likely to license less than 50 percent of their potentially licenceable inventory of IP. To explain this phenomenon, economists and management scholars have identified several potentially significant sources of transaction costs and market failure that may affect technology licensing: information asymmetry problems, such as Arrow's paradox (Arrow, 1962) , moral hazard (Arora, 1996) , and hold-up problems (Pisano, 1991) . While these issues are well understood in theory, surprisingly little is known empirically about the impact of these sources of market failure in this context.
For many products and services, market efficiency can be evaluated by comparing pricing and quantity outcomes to a competitive benchmark. However, outside of university licensing (e.g., Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2002) and very specific contexts (Lerner and Merges, 1998) , data on transactions in the ideas market is generally quite poor. Furthermore, it is unclear what should be the appropriate benchmark used to evaluate technology transactions.
The market design literature (Roth, 2007 (Roth, , 2008 sharpens our focus on the key sources of failure by identifying three market features associated with efficient market operation: (1) market thickness (buyers and sellers have opportunities to trade with a wide range of potential transactors), (2) non-congestion (transaction speed is sufficiently rapid to ensure market clearing but slow enough to allow participants to seek alternatives), and (3) market safety (agents do not have incentives for misrepresentation or strategic action that undermine the ability of others to evaluate potential trades). Gans and Stern (2010) consider these market features in the context of well-established economic properties of the technology sector and conclude that licensing is particularly susceptible to market failure since these three features are often lacking. We build on Roth (2007 Roth ( , 2008 and Gans and Stern (2010) (hereafter, RGS) and employ licensing data to shed light on sources of deal failure in the ideas market.
Overall, we offer three contributions. Our primary contribution is that we provide the first empirical evidence (correlations) relating market features to deal outcomes in the context of licensing. We build on the rich literature on strategic alliances as conduits for interfirm knowledge transfer (e.g., Mowery et al., 1996; Sampson, 2005) and learning (e.g., Dussauge et al., 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004) to illuminate an increasingly common strategy for interfirm knowledge transfer-technology licensing. Furthermore, we add to the strategy literature on technology licensing by providing novel licensing data that shed light on the licensing process from the firms' perspective. The prior strategy literature focuses on how certain factors, such as sector-level differences (Anand and Khanna, 2000) , the presence of multiple technology holders (Fosfuri, 2006) , patent effectiveness (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006) , institutional prestige (Sine et al., 2003) , licensee interactions with the inventor (Agrawal, 2006) , and specific licensing terms (Leone and Reichstein, 2012; Somaya et al., 2010) , affect a firm's propensity to license and commercialization outcomes. Our work adds to this by reporting evidence relating market features to deal success. Since our data is cross-sectional, we do not make causal claims concerning how a specific feature, such as lack of market thickness, causes deal failure. We also note that this survey data reflects participant perceptions rather than independently observed actions. Nevertheless, our correlations offer evidence consistent with the causal mechanisms suggested by theory, and the provision of these basic empirical facts stand in contrast to the general paucity of data on licensing in general and on deal failures in particular.
Our second contribution is that we identify three distinct stages in the licensing process based on expert interviews-(1) identifying a buyer/seller, (2) initiating negotiations, and (3) reaching an agreement-which enables us to better describe when the relationship between each of the market design features and deal failure is most salient. We find market thickness is salient only in the first stage, market safety in the final stage, and bargaining frictions, our operationalization of "congestion," are correlated with deal failure in the middle stage. Third, we show how the relationship between market features and deal failure is mediated by organization type (universities versus firms) and industry type (healthcare versus software & electronics) in ways that can be explained by their economic properties.
EMPIRICS Data
We use the 2006 annual survey conducted by the Licensing Foundation, the charitable and educational arm of the Licensing Executives Society (LES) (U.S.A. and Canada), which we co-designed with subject experts from the Foundation. For a detailed description of the data, see Razgaitis (2006) and Berneman et al. (2009) . What is particularly interesting about the 2006 survey is that a central theme is impediments to licensing. The data are at the firm level, and survey responses provide an interesting and unique window into how organizations perceive licensing challenges.
We provide descriptive statistics in Table 1 . We survey 600 technology-oriented organizations. While the sample is not unrepresentative of LES membership, we cannot conclude it is representative of a random sample of licensing firms. The firms in our sample come from a variety of industries and are relatively large; the average firm in our sample has annual revenues between $1 and $10 billion, an R&D budget between $200 and $500 million, and between 5,000 and 10,000 employees. These firms represent a variety of industries, including energy (11%), healthcare (44%), software & electronics (11%), transportation (3%), and universities (28%). Not all respondents answer every survey question, which is reflected in the varying number of observations across different variables ( Table 1 ). The response rate tends to drop further into the survey, although the response rate for questions regarding deal success and sources of bargaining breakdown is around 70 percent. Conditional on participating in the survey, we do not find any obvious differences in industry affiliation and firm size between responders and nonresponders.
Measures
Our analysis focuses on when each market failure highlighted by RGS is salient during the licensing process. All dependent variables are binary measures that equal 1 if the percentage is greater or equal to the median response category, and 0 otherwise. We construct all of our variables from discrete categories of survey responses. Each dependent variable corresponds to a measure of deal success at a specific stage of the licensing process. We describe each of the three licensing stages in detail in Section 2 of Agrawal, Cockburn, and Zhang (2013) . The three dependent variables are operationalized as follows:
Level of unlicensed IP with at least one potential licensor/licensee
In the first stage of the licensing transaction, firms seek to identify potential buyers or sellers. Our measure of deal success is the level of the organization's unlicensed IP where they are able to identify a potential buyer or seller. The survey asks respondents: "Thinking about intellectual property that could have been licensed in the last 12 months but wasn't, for what percentage was your organization able to identify at least one potential licensee/licensor?" Note this measure focuses on IP that the organization is willing and able to license. IP that the firm cannot or will not license is, at least in principle, excluded. The preceding survey questions ask respondents to identify the percentage of their entire inventory of IP they would never license voluntarily and the percentage they would like to license but cannot. Thus, we attempt to exclude "junk patents" from this measure.
Level of negotiations started
We measure deal success in the second stage by the fraction of negotiations started after buyers or sellers were identified. The survey asks respondents: "Where potential licensees/licensors were identified, in what percentage of cases were substantive negotiations ever started?"
Level of agreements reached
We measure deal success in the third stage by the fraction of negotiations that resulted in an executed agreement. The survey asks respondents: "Of all the times you entered into substantive licensing negotiations in the last 12 months, what percentage resulted in a successful agreement?" Our key explanatory variables correspond to the market features outlined by RGS:
Level of market thickness
Market thickness is a difficult phenomenon to measure and is highly context specific. Here, we measure lack of market thickness by whether respondents agree to the statement that "There are usually fewer potential buyers/sellers for the IP [relative to tangible assets]." The variable takes on a value of 1 if the respondent agrees, and 0 otherwise. This measure roughly corresponds with RGS's definition of market thickness.
Bargaining frictions (congestion)
We capture different types of transaction costs that arise during the bargaining process, some of which correspond to key dimensions of congestion described by RGS. Early in the bargaining process, We converted survey responses into continuous variables. The mean annual revenue corresponds to the category $1-10 billion. The mean annual R&D budget corresponds to the category $200-500 million. The average number of employees in our sample corresponds to the category 5,000-10,000. The average number of licensing professionals employed corresponds to the category 10-25.
Deals Not Done
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the main transaction cost arises from acquiring sufficient information. As a result of the heterogeneity of ideas available on the market and the cost of observing comparable transactions, substantial information asymmetry exists, hence the cost and difficulty of conducting due diligence in the absence of a multilateral exchange environment. As with market thickness, these costs are not easy to measure directly, and again we look to responses to questions that compare licensing transactions to transactions in tangible assets: "Due diligence will be much more difficult/costly for the IP deal [relative to tangible assets]." The variable takes on a value of 1 if the respondent agrees, and 0 otherwise. Later in the bargaining process, key transaction costs are associated with opportunism and contracting problems. As noted by Gans and Stern (2010) , the degree of congestion is related to whether exchanges take place in the shadow of an endogenous outside option for both parties. This is reflected 980 A. Agrawal, I. Cockburn, and L. Zhang by either deal breakdown due to better alternatives emerging for one or more parties or time running out before a deal is completed. We measure these bargaining frictions by responses to some of the survey questions that ask respondents to identify reasons for negotiation breakdowns. For example: "Over the past 12 months, when substantive licensing negotiations have failed to reach an executed agreement, in what percentage of cases was the breakdown due to 'better alternatives emerged for one or more parties' or 'delay (i.e., the clock ran out)?'" Respondents answer by choosing between several discrete response categories (0%, 1-5%, 5-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, 75-99%, 100%); we use the midpoint of these ranges. We also examine other potential sources of bargaining breakdown, such as disagreement over financial and nonfinancial terms, having too many parties at the table, legal and regulatory problems, poor negotiating skills, lack of trust, and ego.
Lack of market safety
We measure a lack of market safety by responses to the question: "Of the IP that your organization would like to license but cannot, approximately what fraction would you say is not effectively protectable by patents, trade secrets, etc.?" This measure corresponds closely to the RGS definition because effective intellectual property protection increases the likelihood that market participants will disclose their preferences truthfully, minimizing the likelihood they will engage in ex post opportunistic behavior once the seller reveals important details of the idea during the course of a negotiation. As before, respondents answer by choosing between discrete response categories, and we use the midpoint of these ranges. We control for a number of factors that may affect our key relationships. In particular, we control for organization size (revenue, R&D budget, number of employees, and number of licensing professionals employed), industry (energy, software & electronics, healthcare, transportation, and university & government-the latter is the omitted category in all specifications), and the level of demand for the firm's IP (using responses to the following question: "Of the IP that your organization would like to license but cannot, approximately what fraction would you say has no discernible demand from end-users?").
Empirical strategy
As discussed above, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to identify causal relationships. Instead, we use correlations to gain insights into our research question. The main estimating equation is:
where DealSuccess i measures the level of deal success for organization i at a particular stage of the licensing process. The main parameters of interest, 1 , 2 , and 3 , represent the estimated effect of a lack of market thickness, bargaining frictions, and a lack of market safety, respectively, on measures of deal success. FirmSize represents a vector of variables that captures the size of the organization, as described above. Similarly, Industry represents a vector of industry dummies. We report average marginal effects from probit models and employ robust standard errors in all our specifications, although the key findings are robust to alternative probability models and samples.
In models not presented in the paper, we run additional regressions using linear probability models, logit models, and ordered probit models, each with both binary and continuous versions of the main independent variables. We also run an ordered probit model with known thresholds, which allows us to accurately specify the thresholds of our survey response categories rather than treating them as unknown (see http://www. applied-ml.com/download/amldoc.pdf). In order to alleviate concerns of respondents' specific propensities to answer high or low on rating scales, we jointly estimate the effect of market features on all three stages of the licensing transaction with a random respondent effect common across all three equations. We also try logged transformations of our dependent variable to ensure we are not estimating beyond the survey category boundaries (e.g., less than 0% or greater than 100%). Our results are largely consistent across all models and specifications.
RESULTS
Descriptive evidence
Before turning to regression analysis, we present summary statistics to provide some basic intuition on the relationship between each of the three market features and deal success in each stage of the licensing process. We categorize firms based on the degree of deal success. We classify a firm as having high deal success if the measure of deal success is greater than the median percentage category. In almost all cases, firms in the low-deal success category are more likely to experience market thinness, lack of market safety, and bargaining frictions, relative to firms in the high-deal success category. However, the relative magnitude in differences of means varies for each dependent variable, suggesting that the relative importance of market thickness, bargaining frictions, and market safety varies at each stage of the licensing process. The means of our measures (lack of market thickness, lack of market safety, and bargaining frictions) are reported for each of the three dependent variables in tables A1-A3 in Agrawal, Cockburn, and Zhang (2013) .
Main results: market features and licensing stages
We now turn to our regression analysis for a more nuanced examination of the link between market features and deal failure. In Table 2 , we consider each of the three discrete stages of the licensing process, respectively: (1) identifying a potential buyer/seller, (2) initiating negotiations, and (3) reaching an agreement. The dependent variable in each table corresponds to our measure of an organization's success rate at each stage of the licensing process: (1) the level of unlicensed IP with at least one potential licensor/licensee identified, (2) the rate at which negotiations are started once potential licensors/licensees are found, and (3) the fraction of negotiations started that ultimately results in a completed agreement. Each column includes controls for demand for IP, firm size, and industry.
Market thickness
Our results are consistent with our main conjectures about the structural features of the ideas market. Lack of market thickness appears to be most important in the first stage of the licensing process since it is the only market feature correlated with deal success at this stage and is not significant in any other stage. It is not surprising that lack of market thickness is associated with lower deal success in the first stage given that it is more difficult to identify potential transactors when the market is thin. Perhaps more interesting is that lack of market thickness is not correlated with deal success in the latter stages. This underscores the bilateral monopoly conditions under which licensing negotiations often occur. Indeed, Gans and Stern (2010) point out that "detailed negotiations over the precise terms and conditions of a license take place in a bilateral rather than multilateral environment … Each potential buyer's value may depend on whether other buyers have had access to the technology or not (since rival access would allow competitors to expropriate some portion of the value by imitating technology)" (p. 820). In other words, although many negotiations are influenced by the shadow of competition, rivalry curtails the influence of potential outside parties and limits the ability of participants to consider alternative offers. We find evidence consistent with Gans and Stern that these negotiations take place in conditions of bilateral monopoly since lack of market thickness is not correlated with deal success during the negotiation phase. Another, though not mutually exclusive, explanation is that parties that anticipate deal failure in the later stages of negotiations due to market thickness issues avoid initiating interactions at the outset and so select out of the process in advance.
Market safety
Lack of market safety is most salient in the third stage. In this last stage of the licensing process, where substantive negotiations have started, the seller reveals material information about the technology. This is likely due to the dynamics of legal due diligence. Due to its cost, many firms only engage in due diligence after they have determined the general feasibility of reaching an agreement. Negotiating parties may be less likely to reach an agreement when sellers are hesitant to provide full disclosure due to expropriation risk (or buyers are hesitant to pay after they have appropriated), consistent with Arrow's paradox (Arrow, 1962) . Thus, effective market safety in the form of IP protection provides a way to limit such behavior ex ante. Interestingly, firms do not seem to anticipate 982 A. Agrawal, I. Cockburn, and L. Zhang The dependent variable in Column 1 is the level of unlicensed IP with at least one potential licensor/licensee identified, in Column 2 is the rate at which negotiations are started once potential licensors/licensees are found, and in Column 3 is the fraction of negotiations started that ultimately results in a completed agreement. The estimates reported in each column are discussed in the Results section. All specifications use probit models. The dependent variable for Stage 1 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the percentage of unlicensed IP with at least one potential licensee/licensor is greater than or equal to the median response (50-75%). The dependent variable for Stage 2 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the percentage of negotiations started once potential licensees/licensors are found is greater than or equal to the median response (25-50%). The dependent variable for Stage 3 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the percentage of agreements reached once substantive negotiations are started is greater than or equal to the median response (50-75%). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 market safety issues since it is not correlated with deal success in the first two stages.
Bargaining frictions
Various bargaining frictions are correlated with deal failure in the negotiation stage. In particular, we find firms most likely to fail to initiate negotiations are the ones with higher perceived costs of due
diligence. An implication of conducting deals in the market for intangibles relative to the product market is that participants face higher levels of uncertainty and heterogeneity regarding the prospects of a deal. As a result, market participants face a higher cost of conducting due diligence, which is exacerbated by the bilateral exchange environment. Thus, even if potential buyers and sellers of IP have been identified, participants are less likely to initiate The regression models employed here are similar to Table 2 but use a restricted sample. This sample restricts firms that have at least 5-25 percent of their negotiations result in an executed agreement. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the level of unlicensed IP with at least one potential licensor/licensee identified, in Column 2 is the rate at which negotiations are started once potential licensors/licensees are found, and in Column 3 is the fraction of negotiations started that ultimately results in a completed agreement. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 negotiations and reach deal completion if the marginal cost of carrying out due diligence is high. Consistent with expectations, the inability to arrive at mutually acceptable financial terms, as well as too many parties at the table, are also salient frictions in the second stage. In the third stage, frictions associated with legal/regulatory problems are salient. Again, market participants do not seem to anticipate these problems, since these frictions are not correlated with deal failure in the first stage of the licensing process (identifying a buyer/seller). Also, we do not find evidence that "delay" and "better alternatives emerged for one or more parties" to be correlated to our measures of deal success. Furthermore, frictions related to behavioral elements, such as "lack of trust," "poor negotiating skills," and "ego," although often cited by practitioners as common sources of deal failure (LESI, 2002) , are not associated with reported rates of deal success at any stage. Taken together, this suggests that bargaining frictions in licensing are mainly shaped by the cost of assessing the deal in a bilateral environment.
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A. Agrawal, I. Cockburn, and L. Zhang Selection A natural concern when observing a lower level of deal success in the first stage is that the unlicensed IP is of low quality. If this is true, then poor quality deals, rather than a lack of market thickness, are associated with low deal success. After all, the skewness of ideas has long been established (Scherer, 1965) . We take a step towards addressing this concern by limiting the sample to firms that have at least 5-25 percent of negotiations reaching an agreement (Table 3) . By focusing on firms that achieve a minimum level of agreements, we reduce the concern that high rates of deal failures early on are mainly attributable to a preponderance of low-quality IP in the firm's portfolio. The estimated coefficients using this restricted sample are similar to those generated from using the full sample. Further, raising the threshold to firms with at least 25-50 percent of negotiations reaching an agreement does not change the main findings. In results not presented in the paper, we also jointly estimate the effect of market features on all three stages of the licensing transaction with a random respondent effect common across all three stages, which accounts for underlying unobserved respondent heterogeneity across the three stages. The results are largely consistent.
Mediating factors: organization type and industry effects
Finally, we explore how the relationship between deal failure and market features is mediated by organization type (universities versus firms) and industry type (healthcare versus software & electronics). Jensen and Thursby (2001) document that university technologies are often licensed at an "embryonic" stage, frequently even before patent applications are filed. We find universities are less likely than firms to be able to identify potential buyers for their IP (Table 4 , Column 1). This is likely due to greater difficulties in establishing product-market fit due to the early-stage nature of their inventions. The predicted probability of deal success in the first stage is roughly 20 percent less for universities compared to firms; in other words, university technologies are more likely to be orphaned. However, conditional on finding a buyer to transact with, universities are 31 percent more likely to reach an executed agreement relative to firms in the final stage (Column 3). We speculate this has to do with the different incentives (both pecuniary and intrinsic) faced by faculty, technology transfer officers, and university administrators, which are distinct on several dimensions from the incentives faced by firms (Lach and Schankerman, 2008; Thursby and Thursby, 2002) . Not only do many universities count utilization, as opposed to profit maximization, as a primary objective, they also do not consider downstream product market competition an alternative to licensing for extracting rents from their intellectual property, unlike many firms. In Table 5 , we restrict the sample to only healthcare and IT (software & electronics) firms. Ideally, we would like to compare just the healthcare and software industries. Unfortunately, we do not have enough variation from the limited number of firms in the latter industry. We know from prior literature that healthcare and IT operate quite differently in terms of technology licensing. Firms in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries traditionally conduct negotiations on a bilateral basis (Gans and Stern, 2000) , whereas IT firms historically have not relied as heavily on patents to appropriate their returns to R&D (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001 ). The main result here is that, in the final stage of reaching an executed licensing agreement, healthcare firms are more harmed than IT firms by a lack of market safety (Column 6). This may be because the IT industry also engages in a variety of substitute All specifications report average marginal effects from probit models. The dependent variable for Columns 1 and 2 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the percentage of unlicensed IP with at least one potential licensee/licensor is greater than or equal to the median response (50-75%). The dependent variable for Columns 3 and 4 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the percentage of negotiations started is greater than or equal to the median response (25-50%). The dependent variable for Columns 5 and 6 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the percentage of agreements reached once substantive negotiations are started is greater than or equal to the median response (50-75%). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 approaches for patent protection, such as rapid innovation and versioning. Furthermore, we find lack of market safety is also negatively correlated with deal success for healthcare firms in the first stage (Column 2), suggesting that to some extent firms may be able to anticipate the problems that might arise due to a lack of market safety.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our results provide suggestive evidence that deal failure is not only prevalent but that the relative salience of each market feature varies across the different stages of the licensing process. How can these trading frictions be minimized? A growing number of firms have begun to utilize online marketplaces that facilitate licensing and other forms of trading between buyers and sellers. Additionally, firms may experience significant returns to developing their licensing team and selecting appropriate legal counsel to navigate negotiations in order to mitigate due diligence costs. Often, a lack of information about prices and transactions appears to be the source of deal failure. Government policy may be able to improve the functioning of ideas markets by increasing transparency through better public reporting of IP transactions and their economic impact, as well as supporting the development of critical market infrastructure (such as timely and predictable dispute resolution mechanisms) and insurance against certain types of risks (akin to real estate markets, where many jurisdictions support title insurance to protect purchasers from legal and technical errors in transactions). Finally, policy makers can play an important role in reducing uncertainty about the scope, validity, and enforceability of IP rights through patent law reform, building consensus around patent valuation, and active exploration of new technologies and processes to improve patent examination (Cockburn, 2007) .
